Pricing Protection: Credit Scores, Disaster Risk, and Home Insurance Affordability -- by Joshua Blonz, Mallick Hossain, Benjamin J. Keys, Philip Mulder, Joakim A. Weill

We use 70 million policies linked to mortgages and property-level disaster risk to show that credit scores impact homeowners insurance premiums as much as disaster risk. Homeowners with low credit pay 24% more for identical coverage than high–credit score homeowners. Leveraging a natural experiment in Washington State, we find that banning the use of credit information considerably weakens the relationship between credit score and pricing. We discuss the role of credit information in pricing and show that, although insurance is often overlooked in discussions of home affordability, a low credit score increases premiums roughly as much as it raises mortgage rates.

NBER > Working Papers

When Incentives Aren't Enough: Evidence on Inattention and Imperfect Memory from HIV Medication Adherence -- by Hang Yu, Jared Stolove, Dean Yang, James Riddell IV, Arlete Mahumane

Financial incentives are widely used to encourage beneficial behaviors, but their effectiveness may be limited by inattention and imperfect memory. We study this in a randomized trial of HIV medication adherence in Mozambique. Financial incentives alone increase adherence by 10.6 percentage points, while pairing incentives with reminders increases adherence by 24.3 percentage points. We develop a model in which inattention to daily adherence and imperfect memory of payment eligibility reduce incentive effectiveness and show that reminders mitigate both frictions. Detailed medication refill data support the model’s predictions. The results suggest combining incentives with reminders can sub..

NBER > Working Papers

Pay Now, Buy Never: The Economics of Consumer Prepayment Schemes -- by Yixuan Liu, Hua Zhang, Eric Zou

Prepaid consumption is a common feature of modern consumer markets and is often presented as a mutually beneficial arrangement: consumers receive upfront discounts, and firms secure future sales. We analyze a large-scale Pay Now, Buy Later (PNBL) program in which consumers prepay for restaurant credit with bonuses, and spend the balance later. Using detailed transaction data from over 4 million consumers, we document widespread balance breakage: approximately 40% of prepaid value is never used. Because many consumers underutilize their balances, merchants recover significantly more than the bonus cost. The median firm earns roughly $5.5 in breakage profit for every $1 of bonus credit issued...

NBER > Working Papers